There is a certain irony in what is happening to Nigerian fintechs. For years, fintechs told banks they were slow, bureaucratic, and disconnected from customers. The fintechs built better products, moved faster, and took substantial parts of the financial services market from them. Now some of those same fintechs have become so large, and so deeply embedded in the movement of money, that the regulator is asking a scary question: what happens to everybody else if one of you fucks up? That, stripped of all the legal grammar, is the argument behind the proposed amendment to the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA).
The Senate passed the amendment in November 2026, and the House of Representatives subsequently passed its version. That’s a significant legislative development, but it isn’t a law in force yet. Tinubu’s assent and the final legislative text still matter. The direction, however, is clear. The Central Bank of Nigeria wants a stronger basis for supervising financial institutions whose failure could threaten more than their own shareholders and customers. Some fintech founders will see this as another attempt to strangle innovation. I think the principle is sound, even if the execution could become a magnificent Nigerian mess.
The real test is not size. It is what happens when you fail.
A systemically important financial institution is one whose failure or serious disruption could damage the wider financial system. That’s the important part. If a small lender’s app stops working, its customers suffer, and its investors may have a terrible week ranting bitterly on Twitter (AKA X), but the rest of Nigeria will probably carry on. If a major payment network fails for three days, merchants may be unable to collect money, customers may be unable to access funds, settlement may be delayed, and other financial institutions may discover that their own services depend on a company they do not control. What began as one company’s technology problem can become everybody’s economic problem.
This is why I would not define systemic importance by customer count, valuation, fundraising, or the amount of noise a company makes on LinkedIn. The more useful dimensions are scale, interconnectedness, substitutability, and the speed at which failure can spread. Substitutability is particularly important. If a payment provider fails, can merchants immediately route transactions through another provider? If a switch goes down, is there another route? If a wallet platform is unavailable, can customers get their money somewhere else? A company can be very large and still be replaceable. Another can be almost invisible to ordinary consumers and yet sit in the middle of infrastructure that the entire industry relies on.
My proposed rubric is brutally simple: if these guys fail, what happens? How many people and businesses are affected? What transaction value and volume stop? How many banks and fintechs depend on them? How quickly can customers move elsewhere? Can an outage cause settlement, liquidity, fraud, or confidence problems in other institutions? And can the company recover without losing or corrupting transaction records? These are questions I believe the CBN should ask, not a claim that it has published this exact scoring methodology. Any serious designation should rest on evidence rather than vibes and insha Allah.
Why the world worries about institutions that cannot be allowed to collapse
The modern version of this conversation came out of the 2008 global financial crisis. Large financial institutions had become so interconnected that their failures threatened other firms, markets, and ordinary people who had never heard of them. Governments faced a horrible choice: allow institutions to collapse and risk a wider financial disaster, or rescue them and effectively make society pay for private-sector mistakes. That is how “too big to fail” became part of the global financial vocabulary. But it was never just about bigness. The deeper problem was that some institutions were too connected, too essential, or too difficult to replace at short notice.
The Financial Stability Board and other international standard setters subsequently developed frameworks for identifying systemically important financial institutions, strengthening their resilience, and making it possible to resolve failures without destroying the financial system. Initially, much of the focus was on banks. That made sense at the time because banks held deposits, extended credit, and connected financial markets. But the way money moves has changed. Payment processors, wallet networks, switches, and other financial technology operators can now be critical infrastructure even if they do not look like traditional banks. If the law only understands a bank as a building with a vault and a branch manager, it will miss where some of the real risk has migrated.
Nigeria isn’t inventing this idea. In the United Kingdom, important payment systems can come under the Bank of England’s financial market infrastructure supervision, with attention to the significance of the system and its connections to the wider market. Singapore similarly regulates designated payment systems under its payment-services framework. These are not identical legal regimes, and it would be intellectually lazy to pretend they are. But they share one principle: private infrastructure can become sufficiently important to the public that its operational resilience is no longer a purely private concern. Once your service becomes part of the country’s financial plumbing, the regulator will want to inspect the pipes.
What the Nigerian proposal actually changes
The BOFIA amendment proposes a framework for identifying and supervising systemically important institutions within the law’s scope. The debate is not merely about whether a company has a banking license. It is about whether the operations of a licensed institution have become sufficiently important that disruption could create wider financial instability. The proposal contemplates stronger governance, cybersecurity and technology-risk controls, operational resilience, reporting, and regulatory oversight. The exact scope and duties must be read against the final enacted text and subsequent CBN rules, rather than assumed from a newspaper headline. In particular, nobody should casually conclude that every technology vendor is automatically captured, or that the CBN has already designated specific companies (even though they might have).
There are two separate questions that regulators must not muddle. The first is whether an institution is important enough to justify enhanced supervision. The second is what additional obligations are proportionate to the actual risks it creates. A wallet operator, a merchant acquirer, a lender, and a technology service provider do not create identical risks. Some hold customer funds. Others process transactions. Others supply software on which regulated institutions depend. Applying the same compliance checklist to all of them would be convenient for the regulator but stupid for the market. Good regulation should follow the risk, not the label on the company’s website.
Let us use actual Nigerian fintechs as examples
Imagine OPay suffers a prolonged nationwide outage. The question is not whether it has a lot of users; that is already obvious and traditional bankers hate that fact. The question is how many of those users would be unable to access money or complete essential payments, how many merchants would be affected, and how quickly alternatives could absorb the disruption. Consider Moniepoint’s merchant ecosystem. If a major part of its merchant payment infrastructure stopped working, would traders lose the ability to collect payments, or could they switch seamlessly? What happens to the flow of money through those businesses? For PalmPay or MoMo, the same analysis should examine wallets, agents, customer dependence, and available substitutes. These are hypothetical stress scenarios, not allegations about the reliability of any of these companies or claims that the CBN has designated them.
Then there is Paystack. I chair Paystack in Nigeria, so I have an obvious interest in this discussion. But that is precisely why I would insist on a serious methodology rather than a popularity contest. If Paystack stopped processing payments, how many merchants would be affected? Which channels would become unavailable? Could those merchants switch to another processor immediately, or would integration, settlement, and operational constraints slow them down? A disruption that affects one payment option is different from a failure that traps funds or disables a critical part of the national payment system. The regulator should understand that difference before applying a systemic label.
And do not forget the infrastructure companies that consumers hardly know exist. Payment switches, settlement infrastructure, identity services, and shared technology providers can create concentration risk even without millions of direct retail customers. I founded Lendsqr, which supplies lending technology, and I understand this issue from the vendor side as well. Serving many lenders does not, by itself, make a software company a systemically important institution under BOFIA. But it should make the lenders using that software ask whether they have a credible continuity plan if a critical vendor becomes unavailable. Regulating a licensed institution and managing its third-party dependencies are related problems, not the same legal power.
The founders will complain. Some of them will have a point.
Enhanced supervision costs money because it means more governance, documentation, resilience testing, incident reporting, vendor oversight, and board attention. It can also mean regulators asking for information that is expensive to produce and difficult to explain. Founders who are now vibe coding on Starlink during random flights to nowhere, shipping changes whenever they feel like it, may discover that running critical financial infrastructure requires a little more discipline. I have limited sympathy for the argument that being innovative should excuse poor controls. If millions of people depend on your service, a production deployment is not a personal experiment.
But the industry should push back hard against vague designation criteria, duplicated reporting, indiscriminate bank-style requirements, and supervisory demands that create new security risks. A regulator asking for visibility into critical systems is reasonable. A regulator demanding uncontrolled access to production environments is a different matter entirely. The CBN should publish its methodology, distinguish risk categories, protect confidential data, provide a credible review and appeal process, and explain how institutions can enter or leave the designated category. Otherwise, the framework could become a moat protecting established players from challengers. Nigeria has enough regulatory bureaucracy already. We do not need to turn financial stability into another industry of forms, committees, and monthly PowerPoint presentations.
What changes for the people running these companies?
For CEOs, this means understanding the company’s dependencies and failure modes as well as its growth numbers. The board should know what happens if the primary processor, cloud provider, banking partner, or settlement route fails on a Friday evening (these things always seem to happen on Fridays, walahi). For CFOs, liquidity, safeguarding, reconciliation, and settlement exposure become central strategic questions. Can you identify where customer money is, what is owed, and what remains unsettled after a major disruption? For chief risk officers, the job is not to produce documents proving that risk management exists. It is to identify how the business could actually fail, test those scenarios, and make sure management can act before a small incident becomes a national embarrassment.
For CTOs and CISOs, the conversation gets even more practical. Can you restore from backup, or do you merely have a backup policy? Can you recover transactions without double-posting, losing money, or inventing balances? Can you isolate a compromised system, understand the blast radius, and bring services back safely? And can you demonstrate all of this rather than wave a document at an examiner? Technology resilience should be measurable. Uptime claims, incident response, recovery objectives, access controls, and reconciliation accuracy must survive an actual test. Boards that treat this as an engineering department problem are missing the point. When the company becomes critical infrastructure, engineering failure becomes a governance failure.
We should regulate the consequences, not the ambition
I support the principle behind this amendment. If a fintech has become so important that its failure can seriously disrupt the financial system, it should be held to a higher standard. That’s not an attack on innovation but a recognition that innovation has succeeded. But the CBN must not mistake company size for systemic risk, or regulatory power for regulatory competence. The framework should be transparent, proportionate, technically informed, and focused on demonstrable consequences of failure. The regulator should also coordinate properly with existing agencies so that firms do not receive five versions of the same request from five different offices.
For years, fintechs asked Nigerians to trust them with their money and businesses. Nigerians did. Some of those companies are now part of the infrastructure on which the economy depends. We cannot celebrate that achievement on one hand and pretend we are harmless little startups on the other whenever accountability arrives. The question isn’t whether fintechs are changing Nigerian finance anymore. They already have. The question is whether the companies that changed it are prepared to carry the responsibility that comes with being indispensable. If your company fucking up can become everybody’s problem, then everybody has a legitimate interest in how you run it.
